🔗 Share this article

At the start of December, the U.S. President brought together the heads of state of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a truce. His pledge was an end to years of warfare in the volatile eastern DRC, describing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to generate significant profit.

Weeks later, however, a sharply contrasting strategy for instability emerged. Officials confirmed that U.S. forces had conducted Christmas Day airstrikes in a region of Nigeria, hitting sites linked to the Islamic State (IS). On a online platform, the President warned, My prior warnings indicated these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Clear Shift in Policy

This dichotomy highlights the central principle of the U.S. engagement with sub-Saharan Africa in this term: a moving away from promoting democracy and human rights in favor of a declared focus on commerce and ending wars—despite the fact that this fits with the nascent military strikes in Nigeria is yet unclear.

“Our view has shifted from Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a phrase we’ve seen thrown around for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” said a top U.S. state department official in a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

An administration representative echoed this, commenting the President “approaches Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American investment, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations achieve stability, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Strategic Results and Contradictions

This change is significant, but observers warn it is early to judge its results. The approach is intertwined with the President’s personal style, which has included conflicts with long-standing U.S. partners and negative rhetoric towards Africans.

“The organizing principle is, if it’s in the long-term or short-term interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” explained a scholar for Africa studies at a prominent foreign policy council.

Key decisions have included:

• Dismantlement of the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. An analysis forecasts this could lead to millions of excess fatalities globally by 2030, with a sizable share in Africa.
• Implementing visa restrictions on citizens from more than two dozen African countries and halting most refugee admissions.
• Starting a global tariff campaign that has hurt African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Allowing a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to expire without renewal.

Geopolitical Neglect and Tensions

Differing from his predecessors, the President avoided sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His most infamous foray into African affairs was referring to nations on the continent with a crude epithet, which he later confirmed using.

“Africa sits at dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for him, but for the administration in general,” remarked the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which allocated only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A major dispute has erupted with South Africa, apparently influenced by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The claim of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa fits perfectly now in U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” commented a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Quid Pro Quo Engagement and Conditional Involvement

A similar standoff emerged with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This conflicted with Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation split between Christians and Muslims and plagued by security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts suggested that the stern rhetoric may have prompted the government into more responsiveness on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had authorized the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

The President has made no secret his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has mediated in the Congo conflict and sent an envoy to try to end the fighting in Sudan’s civil war, so far without success. While the Congo deal seems to have been broken quickly, it “at least serves to introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” noted one conflict expert.

Similar to Competitors

Observers see the new U.S. approach as reminiscent of that of global rivals like Russia and China, who have deepened their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on economic interests.

“This is a delayed recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” commented one foreign policy analyst.

In practice, the current policy likely means that “a state that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The engagement that we are talking about does not seek to spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a business-oriented posture towards Africa,” she added.