Returning in the start of the year, amid Donald Trump’s campaign vows to end the conflict in Ukraine “within 24 hours” remaining vivid in minds, there was real concern in Moscow over Trump’s plans. After Mr. Trump mused that significant levels of Tariffs, Tariffs, and Restrictions” on Russia might be necessary, one prominent pro-war Moscow analyst wrote: “It’s better to get ready for the worst. Soon, we’ll reflect on the previous term with fondness, like a thaw.”
Unfulfilled Warnings and Missed Chances
Just how mistaken was that view? Since then, the US president has repeatedly spoken a big game without coming close to walking the walk. By May, after Vladimir Putin rejected a 30-day truce, and peace talks in Turkey went nowhere, a devastating” US sanctions package did not to appear. An 8 August cut-off for Mr Putin to agree to a ceasefire somehow morphed into a lavish welcome in Alaska, where Mr Trump praised a leader sought for atrocities as he disembarked from his plane. The “severe consequences” warned of by Mr Trump if the Alaska talks did not lead to peace did not occur.
Emboldened Moves and Allied Weaknesses
Empowered, Mr Putin has thus continued to pursue his war objectives in Ukraine, and probe for Nato weaknesses. Last week’s intrusion of Russian drones into Polish territory laid bare inadequate Nato planning, as F-35 and F-16 fighter jets were quickly scrambled to counter cheap kamikaze devices that cost around $10,000 each to produce. It also sent a warning of possible intensification if any future “reassurance force” deploying European troops on Ukrainian soil. Such provocation called for a robust and coordinated response, applying the kind of pressure on the Kremlin which Mr Trump has to date refused to countenance. Instead the US president seems, yet again, to prefer pressuring his European allies to confronting Mr Putin. In a statement which smacked of bad faith, Mr Trump stated over the weekend that the US was “prepared” to impose stricter sanctions on Russia, but only if certain unlikely conditions were met.
Unrealistic Demands and Trade Leverage
Aiming for a considerable economic prize, Washington is insisting that the EU must boost its imports of US LNG at a rate that analysts consider undoable. Other stipulations include the imposition by the EU of 50%-100% tariffs on Russia’s most important ally, China, and an end to all imports of Russian oil by Nato members. This includes Turkey, which has refused to sanction Moscow, imports 57% of its oil from Russia, and lies outside the EU.
Those looking on the positive side in Brussels believe that Mr Trump’s pressure may persuade Maga-friendly governments in Hungary and Slovakia to end their deep dependence on Russian energy imports. That is extremely unlikely to happen, as Mr Trump and his advisers must know. Nor can the EU afford to risk the kind of economic response from Beijing that caused Mr Trump himself to back down from a full-blown trade war not long ago.
Ominous Events and Absence of Movement
During this week’s state visit, it will be Sir Keir Starmer’s turn to try to press Mr Trump down on concrete action. But from the unproductive Alaska talks to his latest distracting tactics with the EU, Mr Trump keeps finding reasons not to get tough on Russia. Last week’s drone incursion in Poland represented an worrying raising of the ante. Ukraine’s prospects, and wider European security interests, are being steadily undermined by a president who, in this context, barks but never acts.
